My point is not that there is a particular philosophers' position that can be contrasted with a particular economists' (or even Friedman's) position. After all, Pascal surely recognized that there were a variety of views of God among the philosophers. Nor would I suggest that philosophy has nothing valuable to say about, or learn from, Friedman's essay; nor Friedman about or from philosophy. It is rather a matter of approach. Friedman cares most about doing economics and is largely innocent of the interests of philosophers and, equally, of the distinctions and nuances that philosophers routinely employ. If we -either as economists or philosophers -insist on reading the essay as a philosophical work addressed to philosophers, we must misread it.
The most infamous passage in Friedman's essay runs: "Truly important and significant hypotheses will be found to have 'assumptions' that are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality, and, in general, the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions (in this sense)" (p. 14).
2 Samuelson (1963, pp. 232-233 ) sees this as the extreme version of Friedman's general proposition that " [a] theory is vindicated if (some of) its consequences are empirically valid to a useful degree of approximation; the (empirical) realism of the theory 'itself,' or of its 'assumptions,' is quite irrelevant to its validity and worth," which he stigmatizes with the shorthand Ftwist.
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The view that Friedman does not care about the truth of the assumptions faces a serious difficulty. After recounting the detailed evidence on the cyclical behavior of 2 Except where context would render it ambiguous, references to Friedman (1953) will be referred to hereinafter by page numbers without dates. 3 Replacing Friedman by his initial is an indication that Samuelson (1963, p. 232 ) is aware that the F-twist may be "a misinterpretation of [Friedman's] intention." While Samuelson rails against Friedman's apparent abandonment of truth and realism, Frazier and Boland (1983) turn it into a positive virtue. They interpret Friedman as an instrumentalist and defend instrumentalism as a logically sound doctrine. My suggestion here is that they have misinterpreted Friedman -he is not an instrumentalist -and my suggestion in Hoover (1984) is that Frazer and Boland's version of instrumentalism is not sound doctrine.
money and the real economy, Friedman and Schwartz (1963b, pp. 213-214) raises the question, how we can be sure about the direction of influence?
It might be, so far as we know, that one could marshal a similar body of evidence demonstrating that the production of dressmakers' pins has displayed over the past nine decades a regular cyclical pattern; that the pin pattern reaches a peak well before the reference peak and a trough well before the reference trough; that its amplitude is highly correlated with the amplitude of the movements in general business. It might even be demonstrated that the simple correlation between the production of pins and consumption is higher than the simple correlation between autonomous expenditures and consumption; that the partial correlation between pins and consumption -holding autonomous expenditure constant -is as high as the simple correlation; and that the correlation between consumption and autonomous expenditures -holding the production of pins constant -is on the average zero. . . [B] ut even if [these statements] were demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt, they would persuade neither us nor our readers to adopt a pin theory of the cycle.
But why not? In Friedman and Schwartz's thought experiment, the pin theory of the cycle has implications that are confirmed facts. Why should the same variety of evidence that supports a monetary theory not equally well support a pin theory? "Primarily, the difference is that we have other kinds of evidence" (Friedman and Schwartz 1963b, p. 214): (i) pins are a trifling element in the economy, and "[w]e expect the effect to be in rough proportion to the cause", but money is pervasive in economies that experience business cycles; (ii) with money we can, and with pins we cannot, conceive of channels through which large autonomous changes in them might affect the economy; (iii) in contrast to a monetary theory, no serious student of business cycles has ever seriously suggested a pin theory. wrong. On the contrary, Friedman's methodological stance in the essay is best described as causal realism, which can be defined as the view that the object of scientific inquiry is the discovery through empirical investigation of the true causal mechanisms underlying observable phenomena.
One object of the current essay is to support this controversial claim. To do so, I
propose to read Friedman's essay charitably -not as the work of an amateur philosopher but as the work of an economist, one whose methodological reflections are consistent with his intellectual antecedents and with his own empirical practice. Friedman's most important intellectual antecedent is Alfred Marshall. Marshall's writings are Friedman's economic Bible. When, after a long and illustrious life, Friedman finally passes on, he may well leave a scrap of paper pinned to the lining of his coat on which will be written:
"The Methodology of Marshall, not the Methodology of the philosophers."
II. The Absence of Causal Talk
If Friedman is a causal realist, there surely is a puzzle in his work: he rarely talks about causes. In the 814 pages of Monetary History, a work that I maintain is an exemplary piece of causal realist research, the words "cause" or "causal" is used -as far as I can tell -only nine times, and four of those nine are attributed to agents of the Federal Reserve (see Table 1 ). 4 Similarly, Friedman's claim that the effect should be proportional to cause cited earlier is one of only two instances of causal talk in "Money and Business
Cycles." What is more, Friedman is conscious of his own unease with respect to causal talk. Tobin (1970, p. 301) the economist "must stand by the more laborious plan of interrogating the facts in order to learn the manner of action of causes singly and in combination." Friedman's and Marshall's object, then, is the acquisition of causal truth. The barrier is the complexity.
Marshall (p. 157) writes that economic "causes often lie below the surface and are likely to be overlooked by the ordinary observer." Similarly, in his essay Friedman (p. 33) writes:
A fundamental hypothesis of science is that appearances are deceptive and that there is a way of looking at or interpreting or organizing the evidence that will reveal superficially disconnected and diverse phenomena to be manifestations of a more fundamental and relatively simple structure.
The Monetary History can be seen as an attempt to apply put that hypothesis to the test.
In the "Summing Up" at the end of the book, Friedman and Schwartz (1963a, p. 676) echo the Marshallian methodological conclusion: "In monetary matters, appearances are deceiving; the important relationships are often precisely the reverse of those that strike the eye."
Opposed to a naïve empiricism, Friedman and Marshall give theory a special role.
" [F] acts by themselves," writes Marshall, "are silent. Observation discovers nothing directly of the action of causes, but only sequences in time" (Marshall, p. 166 What is a theory? Friedman (1949, p. 91 ) draws his interpretation of "theory" directly from Marshall:
Economic theory, in this view, has two intermingled roles: to provide "systematic and organized methods of reasoning" [Marshall, p. 164; cf. Friedman 1953, p. 7] about economic problems; to provide a body of substantive hypotheses, based on factual evidence, about the "manner of action of causes" [Marshall, p. 171] .
Theory, or what Marshall (p. 164) calls the "economic organon" is "not a body of concrete truth, but an engine for the discovery of concrete truth, similar to, say, the theory of mechanics" (Marshall p. 159 ; quoted in part by Friedman 1949, p. 90) . The ideal theory for Marshall is universal, saying nothing about particulars, and needing to be supplemented with particular facts if its is to be useful. Economic theory, however, has not yet reached universality so that it is necessary "to sacrifice generality of form to some extent" (Marshall, p. 160 ).
In the essay, Friedman characterizes theory as, in part, "a 'language'" (p. 7), an "analytical filing system" (p. 11) constituted of tautologies that are useful in "organizing refractory empirical phenomena" (p. 12) and, "[i]n part, a body of substantive hypotheses designed to abstract essential features of complex reality" (p. 7).
Both Friedman and Marshall conceive of theory as a purely deductive system, whose claims are universal. Even the particulars that, on the one hand, fill the lacunae of incomplete theory and, on the other hand, tie that theory to empirical applications are strained and filtered to pick out what is "essential": the color of the wheat-trader's hair or number of members of his family are not relevant particulars (Friedman p. 32 Friedman's view of the status of theoretical axioms is virtually identical to that of Bertrand Russell (1918, pp. 145-146) :
When pure mathematics is organized as a deductive system -i.e. as the set of all those propositions that can be deduced from an assigned set of premises -it becomes obvious that, if we are to believe in the truth of pure mathematics, it cannot be solely because we believe in the truth of the premises. Some of the premises are much less obvious than some of their consequences, and are believed chiefly because of their consequences. This will be found to be always the case when a science is arranged as a deductive system. It is not the logically simplest propositions of the system that are the most obvious or that provide the chief part of our reasons for believing in the system . . . Electro-dynamics, for example, can be concentrated into Maxwell's equations, but these equations are believed because of the observed truth of certain of their logical consequences.
Friedman subscribes both to Russell's claim that axioms are often not obvious ("appearances are deceiving") and that they are supported by indirect evidence. In dismissing as futile "Walrasian" criticism of the realism of assumptions, Friedman is attacking naïve theoreticism -the idea that a theory should (or must) mirror casually parsed facts about the world. Instead, Friedman argues that a theory needs to get to the essence of the matter. Generally, that requires the creation of categories of entities that are not directly observable, governed by rules that omit irrelevant details, whose success is to be judged holistically.
In his monetary analysis, Friedman illustrates this strategy. is probably the sense of realism in play when he attacks the need for a theory to provide "photographic descriptions of reality" (Friedman 1949, p. 91) . "Lack of realism" for Friedman is just another (and for many philosophers, perhaps paradoxical) way of referring to the desirable property than a theory capture the essence of a deep relationship.
Marshall (p. 166), in arguing for a theoretical approach to empirical phenomena, notes that "every event is the complex result of so many causes, so closely interwoven that the past can never throw a simple and direct light on the future." In much the same vein, Friedman (p. 25) argues that a model is a half-truth: although "there is nothing new under the sun" (that is, generalization is the essence of the model), "history never repeats itself" (all generalizations omit particularities). Yet, both Marshall and Friedman see the immersion of the theorist in the particularities of factual inquiry as the source of further generalizations. The more the theorist is successful at eliminating necessary reference to particularities, the more general and more powerful the theory becomes, and the more nearly it approaches Marshall's ideal of a universal economic doctrine (Friedman, p. 159; Marshall, p. 14) . Paradoxically, it is unrealisticness that serves and underwrites
Friedman's realism with respect to the deep causal mechanisms.
Marshall, of course, did not claim that universal economic doctrine was ready to hand. Friedman (p. 34) sees the complexity of economic phenomena as itself an argument for the incompleteness of economic theory. To accept the complexity of phenomena as an irreducible fact is to deny "the tentative state of knowledge that alone makes scientific activity meaningful. By way of illustration, he heaps scorn on John Stuart Mill's claim that the laws of value (in 1848!) were complete and required no future development. Economic theory is unrealistic in the sense that it is incomplete. But the only completeness that is valuable scientifically is that which reduces its particularity and simplifies the complexity of phenomena.
The essence of Friedman's Marshallian stance is that the pursuit of substantive knowledge cannot be stymied by the incompleteness and, therefore, "unrealism" of theory. We cannot have a complete, realistic theory first and apply it to concrete phenomena afterwards. Nor can we start with atheoretical facts, for there are none; facts are theory laden. All we can do is to work back and forth between theory and facts, starting with the primitive and highly tentative and working towards the sophisticated and more secure. In this process, we can tolerate a large a lack of realism in another sense.
Predictions based on theoretical assumptions that are only approximate and, therefore, unrealistic may be as accurate as we can use given our ability to measure or as accurate as we need for some practical purposes We have little confidence in our knowledge of the transmission mechanism, except in such broad and vague terms as to constitute little more than an impressionistic blueprint. Indeed, this is the challenge our evidence poses: to pin down the transmission mechanism in specific enough detail that we can hope to make reasonably accurate predictions of the course of a wide variety of economic variables on the basis of information about monetary disturbances. [Cf. Friedman and Schwartz 1963a, pp. 678-679.] The dual call for realistic elaboration of the assumptions of the theory and, simultaneously, for securing breadth of generalization could not be clearer.
In principle, any theoretical propositions are at risk of being overthrown in the face of predictive failure. Although the collapse of a bridge might be taken as evidence by some as a failure of the theory of mechanics, cautions that the theory ought to be regarded as secure in this case and its application questioned. 
V. Effects, Not Causes
We must now revisit the puzzle of why, if Friedman is a causal realist, he is so averse to using causal language. In his interview with Hammond (1992, p. 92), Friedman said:
"The problem that bothers me about cause is that it almost invariably leads into a problem of infinite regress. There is no such thing as the cause of anything." Friedman sees every "proximate cause" standing in a chain of influence. What is more, influences between two variables can go in both directions. While much of Friedman and Schwartz's work has aimed to document the dominant influence of money over income and business activity, they have candidly acknowledged that influence runs from income and business activity to money as well (e.g., Friedman and Schwartz 1963a, p. 695; 1963b, p. 214; Friedman 1970, p. 321) . It is not only the existence of causal chains that concern Friedman; he also worries that independent factors might influence any variable at one time and that there are no unambiguous ways to count causes (Friedman 1970, p. 319).
Friedman's squeamishness with respect to causal language can be seen as consistent with his Marshallian stance. The problem with talking about causes is that, working backwards in time, the chain never ends and, working contemporaneously, the array of causes is (perhaps infinitely) wide. Causal talk could be regarded as the enemy of Marshall's strategy of analyzing problems in manageable units: where do we draw the lines delimiting the scope of our causal interests? To think in causal language is to risk losing focus.
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As Table 2 shows, Friedman frequently replaces talk of causes with circumlocutions that concentrate on effects. One might argue that effects are necessarily correlative to causes, so that this circumlocution is pointless. But that would miss the asymmetry of causation. Effects are defined as a terminus. From the point of view of an effect, the whole world and all of history spreads out around and behind us as potential causes. From the point of view of the cause, the effects lie in relatively compact lines. This is obvious in tracing genealogies: it is a relatively manageable task to trace the descendents of a particular man; it is a completely open-ended task to trace his ancestors.
Friedman is by no means alone. In his account of causal analysis, the statistician Paul Holland (1986) argues that we should attempt to assess the effects of a cause and not the causes of an effect, on the grounds that the first will produce stable knowledge, while the second is necessarily always an incomplete task. Holland adds on top of Friedman's worries, that anytime we assign a proximate cause to an effect, we place ourselves hostage to future research that may find a more elaborate causal chain lying between the (now obviously not proximate) cause and the effect. In contrast, once the effect of a cause is established, further knowledge elaborates the mechanism perhaps, but does not threaten the truth status of the original claim. Friedman is clearly thinking along similar lines when he claims that changes in nominal income are an effect of money, while at the same time calling for investigation into the transmission mechanism that would elaborate that channel as well as others.
There is, as he himself recognizes (Hammond 1992, p. 97 ) a large element of semantic choice in Friedman's avoidance of explicit use of "cause" and etymologically related terms. It is a semantic choice that reinforces, and is reinforced by, his Marshallian stance. His usage is not, however, substantive in that it in no way undermines his general commitment to causal realism, which is the commitment to the existence of structures governing the causal influences among economic variables.
VI. Milton Friedman's Causal Legacy
My reading of "Methodology of Positive Economics" turns large amounts of Friedman scholarship upside down. Most methodologists and most practicing economists have read Friedman's essay as offering a rationale for being unconcerned for the truth status of the assumptions of a theory. What matters is not whether markets are perfectly competitive or whether people form rational expectations, but whether they act as if they do. 9 Hutchison (1992 Hutchison ( , 2000 and Blaug (2002a, b) have taken Friedman to have licensed the rise of formalism in economics on the basis of such an interpretation of the essay.
Hands (2003) The relationship in Figure 1 is itself not necessarily causal. I find it hard to believe that Friedman's own fastidiousness about the use of causal language was either directly influential or even shared widely in the economics profession. But I have argued at length elsewhere that the fall and rise of causal usage is connected to the rise and fall of formalism in econometrics, which is itself closely connected to the rise and fall of formalism in economics generally (Hoover 2004) . Thus, to the extent that the common interpretation of Friedman's essay set the stage for overvaluing formalism in economics,
we are left with an ironic conclusion: "The Methodology of Positive Economics" is best read as advocating causal realism. At the same time, it was a contributing cause in the suppression of causal language in economics.
10 Figure "the amount of high-powered money is a dependent rather than an independent variable, and is not subject to governmental determination." [p. 52] "Such shifting expectations could affect the price of gold only as they affected the demand for and supply of foreign exchange . . ." [p. 58] "the government did succeed in bringing about a minor reduction in the stock of highpowered money . . ." [p.81] "The major channel of influence was from the stock of money to the level of money income to the level of prices, and thence to the rate of exchange between the dollar and other currencies, though undoubtedly some influences ran in the other direction." [p. 89] "These measures, in turn however, had offsetting effects, since debt redemption reduced the amount and raised the price of bonds available to serve as backing for national bank notes, and so led to a reduction in national bank notes from a peak of some $350 million in 1882 to a trough of some $160 million in 1891." [p. 128] "there was no evidence on the length of the lag between action and effect." [p. 239] (Continued next page) ( Table 2 continued) "the decline in the stock of money and the near-collapse of the banking system can be regarded as a consequence of nonmonetary forces in the United States, and monetary and nonmonetary forces in the rest of the world." [p. 300] "if it did initiate a worldwide disturbance, it would inevitably be affected in turn by reflex influences from the rest of the world."
"the rapid rise in the money stock certainly promoted and facilitated the concurrent economic expansion." [p. 544] Notes: emphasis in bold type added; page numbers in square brackets. Causal Language shows articles in the econometric family and causal family (= "cause," "causes," "causal," "causally," "causality," or "causation.") as a fraction of the econometrics family (= "econometric(s)," "regression(s)," "structural model(s)," "estimate," or "estimation."). Friedman's Positivism in a Causal Context = "Friedman" and ("positive economics" or "as if") and causal family and econometric family expressed as a fraction of articles using the econometrics family and causal family. Heavy, smooth lines are sixth-degree polynomial trends.
